Can Housing Collateral Explain Long-Run Swings in Asset Returns? by Hanno Lustig & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









The authors thank Thomas Sargent, Dave Backus, Robert Hall, Lars Peter Hansen, and Dirk Krueger
for their guidance and David Chapman, Urban Jermann, Leonid Kogan, Monika Piazzesi, and Martin
Schneider for their discussions of this paper. We also benefited from comments from seminar participants
at Duke University, University of Iowa, Universite de Montreal, New York University Stern, UCLA,
Stanford University, the Society for Economic Dynamics Meetings and the Western Finance Association
meetings in Keystone. For computing support we thank NYU Stern. The views expressed herein are
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
© 2006 by Hanno Lustig and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.Can Housing Collateral Explain Long-Run Swings in Asset Returns?
Hanno Lustig and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh




To explain the low-frequency variation in US equity and debt returns in the 20th century, we solve
an equilibrium model in which households face housing collateral constraints. An increase in the ratio
of housing to human wealth loosens these borrowing constraintsthus allowing for more risk sharing.
The rate of return that households require for holding equity decreases as a result. Feeding the historical
time series of US housing collateral into the model replicates four features of long-run asset returns.
(1) It produces a fifteen percent equity premium during the 1930s and a slow decline of the equity
premium from eleven percent in the 1960s to four percent in 2003. (2) It generates large unexpected
capital gains for equity holders, especially in the 1990s. (3) The risk-free rate and the housing collateral
ratio are strongly positively correlated at low frequencies. (4) The model mimics the slow decline
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Some of the most dramatic historical episodes in equity markets have coincided with changes
in housing markets. For example, the equity premium was very high in the 1930s when the
value of the housing stock was low relative to output, while the gradual decline in the equity
premium in the post-war period coincided with a sustained increase in housing values. This
time-variation in equity premia cannot be accounted for in standard asset pricing models
(Breeden (1979) and Lucas (1978)). This paper explores whether changes in the value of the
housing stock can account for the timing and magnitude of these changes in equity markets.
To explore this question, we model households who di®er by their income histories. They
share income risk by trading contingent claims, but they cannot borrow more than the value
of their house. When housing collateral is scarce, this borrowing constraint limits risk sharing
more; as a result, risk premia are higher. Thus, risk premia vary over time and with housing
collateral. This modest friction is a realistic one for an advanced economy like the US.1
The contribution of this paper is to show that the long-run variation in the amount of
housing collateral quantitatively accounts for a large part of the long-run variation in stock
and bond returns in the US. The calibrated model replicates (1) the long-run decline in
the equity premium in the post-war period, documented by Jagannathan, McGrattan and
Scherbina (2000), (2) the associated unanticipated capital gains for stock holders -which
were especially high in the 1990s-, documented by Fama and French (2002), (3) the long-
run °uctuations in the risk-free return, section 4 documents a strong positive relationship
between the housing wealth-to-income ratio and the risk-free rate in the data, and (4) the
decline in the volatility of the equity premium and the risk-free rate, also documented in
section 4. The model produces a high equity premium in the 1930s because that was a
period of collateral scarcity. Post-war, the model-predicted equity premium falls as housing
collateral services became more abundant. The increase in the mortgage to income ratio
1Our emphasis on housing, rather than ¯nancial assets, re°ects three features of the US economy: the
participation rate in housing markets is very high (2/3 of households own their home), the value of the
residential real estate makes up over seventy-¯ve percent of total assets for the median household (Survey of
Consumer Finances, 2001), and housing is a prime source of collateral (75 percent of household borrowing
in the data is collateralized by housing wealth, US Flow of Funds, 2003). To keep the model exposition
simple, we abstract from ¯nancial assets or other kinds of capital (such as cars) that households may use to
collateralize loans. However, in the calibration we explore the e®ects of using a broader measure of collateral.
1from 12% to 100% relaxes borrowing constraints, enables more risk sharing, and produces a
decline in the equity premium from 11% in the 1950s to 4% in 2002. For the same reason,
the predicted volatility of stock returns and the riskless interest rate decreases substantially.
Because housing collateral increases rapidly in the 1990s, risk premia drop unexpectedly
and this generates large unanticipated capital gains for stock holders. Lastly, the model
generates a positive correlation between the riskless interest rate and the amount of housing
collateral because times with scarce collateral are times in which the price for insurance
against binding collateral constraints is high; precautionary savings push down the interest
rate. Overall, our model overpredicts the volatility of the risk-free rate.
The main challenge in the asset pricing literature since Breeden (1979) and Lucas (1978)
has been to develop an equilibrium model that can generate returns on stocks and bonds
with the right properties in the time-series and in the cross-section. Several classes of models
have been shown to be consistent with unconditional asset pricing moments. More recently,
the literature has shifted its attention towards the models' ability to generate time-varying
risk premia. While empirical explanatory variables that predict returns abound, getting
an equilibrium model to deliver su±cient time-variation has proven much more challenging
(e.g. Lettau and Ludvigson (2003)). The extant models seem to deliver either limited time-
variation in risk premia, or the time-variation rests on unobserved or hard-to-estimate driving
forces.2 Our model has the advantage that its driving force, housing collateral, is observable.
This allows us to feed in the historically observed housing collateral series into the model
and to ask whether the model's predicted returns are consistent with the historical ones.
This historical accounting exercise, based solely on observables, makes the model's successes
and failures more apparent, and ultimately lends credibility to the explanation. Moreover,
2While the habit literature successfully reproduces many of the empirically observed features of stock
prices, such as time-varying risk premia, in a model with a single representative agent with habit-based
preferences (e.g., Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and Menzly, Santos
and Veronesi (2004)), this class of models is di±cult to test directly because the aggregate habit is unobserved.
Also, habit preferences aggregate have some unappealing public policy implications (Ljungqvist and Uhlig
(2000)). The long-run risk literature introduces a small but persistent component in aggregate consumption
and dividend growth (e.g., Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Hansen, Heaton and Li (2005)). This turns out to
be very useful for matching smooth consumption data and volatile returns. However, it is hard to distinguish
between i.i.d. consumption growth and a speci¯cation that includes a small, predictable component based
on available quantity data (e.g., Colacito and Croce (2005)). Finally, both classes of models could only
address the long-run decline in the US equity premium through a radical change in the time series process
for aggregate consumption growth, which again may be hard to detect in the data.
2our quantitative asset pricing results show that the housing collateral mechanism is able to
induce the observed amount of time-variation in risk premia.
This paper ¯ts into a literature that studies the impact of time variation in risk sharing on
asset prices in a heterogeneous agent economy model (e.g., Telmer (1993), Constantinides and
Du±e (1996), Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2006), and especially Alvarez and Jermann
(2000, 2001)). Compared to the extant heterogenous agent models, the focus of our exercise is
on generating more time-variation in risk premia. This comes at the cost of a volatile riskless
interest rate. A version of the model with a higher degree of inter-temporal substitution
mitigates this problem. It also connects closely to the work of Ortalo-Magn¶ e and Rady
(2002, 2006), which studies the impact of borrowing constraints and income shock dispersion
on equilibrium housing prices.
Competing explanations for the low frequency evolution of asset prices abound: changing
demographics (Geanakoplos, Magill and Quinzii (2004)), taxation (McGrattan and Prescott
(2005)), stock market participation (Calvet, Gonzalez-Eiras and Sadini (2003) and ?), stock
market regulation, globalization, consumption growth volatility (Lettau, Ludvigson and
Wachter (2006)), and technology (Pastor and Veronesi (2005) and Jermann and Quadrini
(2006)). Yet none of these competitors can simultaneously explain time-series and cross-
sectional return variation. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) shows that housing col-
lateral risk is priced in the cross-section of asset returns. Thus, housing collateral is an
attractive mechanism because it o®ers a uni¯ed explanation for a broad set of long-run and
short-run facts.
Section 1 models households who trade a complete menu of assets, as in Lucas (1978), but
they face endogenous solvency constraints because they can repudiate their debts. When a
household chooses to repudiate its debts, it loses all its housing wealth but its labor income is
protected from creditors. The household is not excluded from trading. In Kehoe and Levine
(1993), Krueger (2000), Kehoe and Perri (2002), and Krueger and Perri (2005), limited com-
mitment is also the source of incomplete risk-sharing. But the outside option upon default is
exclusion from all future risk sharing arrangements. Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show how
to decentralize these Kehoe and Levine (1993) equilibria with sequential trade. Geanakoplos
and Zame (2000) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003) consider a di®erent environment in
3which individual assets collateralize individual promises in a standard incomplete markets
economy. We model the outside option as bankruptcy with loss of all collateral assets; all
promises are backed by all collateral assets. Section 2 explains the equilibrium dynamics of
the two driving forces: the wealth distribution and the collateral ratio. These two forces
interact to deliver high equity premia, volatile equity premia, and high Sharpe ratios when
collateral is scarce. We calibrate the model in section 3.
We feed the model seven decades worth of US data on aggregate consumption growth and
housing collateral ratio dynamics. Section 4 computes the model-implied equity premium
and risk-free rate, and compares their low-frequency evolution to the one in the US data.
Section 5 argues that the housing explanation is plausible because the model's return pre-
dictability, Sharpe ratio variability, and unconditional asset pricing moments mostly match
the data. Especially the high volatility of the Sharpe ratio is a feature that most equilibrium
models cannot account for. The appendix provides proofs of the propositions, details of the
calibration and the computational algorithm, and it contains a detailed discussion of the
unconditional asset pricing moments.
1 Model
1.1 Environment
Uncertainty The economy is populated by a continuum of in¯nitely lived households. The
structure of uncertainty is twofold: s = (y;z) is an event that consists of a household-speci¯c
component y 2 Y and an aggregate component z 2 Z. These events take on values on a
discrete grid S = Y £Z. We use st = (yt;zt) to denote the history of events. St denotes the
set of possible histories up until time t. The state s follows a Markov process with transition







0jy;z) 8z 2 Z;y 2 Y:
Because of the law of large numbers, ¼z(y) denotes both the fraction of households drawing
y when the aggregate event is z and the probability that a given household is in state y when
4the aggregate state is z.3
Preferences We use fxg to denote an in¯nite stream fxt(st)g
1
t=0. There are two types
of commodities in this economy: a consumption good c and housing services h. These































The parameter Ã > 0 converts the housing stock into a service °ow, ° governs the degree
of relative risk aversion, and " is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between non-
durable consumption and housing services.4
Endowments The aggregate endowment of the non-durable consumption good is denoted
fcag. The growth rate of the aggregate endowment depends only on the current aggregate
state: ca
t+1(zt+1) = ¸(zt+1)ca
t(zt). Each household is endowed with a labor income stream
f´g. The labor income share ^ ´(yt;zt) = ´(yt;zt)=ca(zt), only depends on the current state





0;z) = 1; 8z;t ¸ 0:
The aggregate endowment of housing services is denoted fhag and ½(zt) denotes the
relative price of a unit of housing services. The calibration speci¯es a process for the ratio of
non-housing expenditures and housing services expenditures frg, r(zt) =
ca(zt)
½(zt)ha(zt), rather
than for fhag directly.
3The usual caveat applies when applying the law or large numbers. We implicitly assume the technical
conditions outlined by Uhlig (1996) are satis¯ed.
4The preferences belong to the class of homothetic power utility functions of Eichenbaum and Hansen
(1990). Special cases are separability (" = °¡1) and Cobb-Douglas preferences (" = 1).
5Trading To keep the notation simple, there is no net positive wealth other than housing
and no trade in stocks in the model. Since a complete menu of assets is traded, explicitly
allowing trade in stocks would obviously not change anything, other than through its e®ect
on the supply of collateral. In our calibration, we do include other sources of collateralize-
able ¯nancial wealth. We also choose the simplest model of housing markets, without any
frictions, to examine the collateral mechanism.
Each household is assigned a label (`;s0), where ` denotes the time-zero collateral wealth
of this household. The cross-sectional distribution of initial non-labor wealth and income
states (`;s0) is denoted L0. So, ` denotes the value of the initial claim to housing wealth as
well as any ¯nancial wealth that is in zero net aggregate supply.
We let fc(`;s0)g denote the stream of consumption and we let fh(`;s0)g denote the
stream of housing services of a household of type (`;s0). The ¯nancial markets are complete:
households trade a complete set of contingent claims a in forward markets, where ¡at(`;st;s0)
is a promise made by agent (`;s0) to deliver one unit of the consumption good if event s0 is
realized in the next period. These claims are in zero net supply, and trade at prices qt(st;s0).5
All prices are quoted in units of the non-durable consumption good. There are frictionless
rental markets and markets for home ownership; ownership and housing consumption are
separated. The rental price is ½t(zt); ph
t(zt) denotes the (asset) price of the housing stock.
Because of the law of large numbers, these prices only depend on aggregate histories.
At the start of each period, the household purchases non-housing consumption in the
spot market ct(`;st), housing services in the rental market hr
t(`;st), contingent claims in the
¯nancial market and ownership shares in the housing stock ho






















Next period wealth is labor income, plus assets, plus the cum-dividend value of owned
5This setup is equivalent to having ¯nancial intermediaries trade in state contingent claims and provide






















Collateral Constraints Households can default on their debts. When the household
defaults, it keeps its labor income in all future periods. The household is not excluded from
trading, even in the same period. However, all collateral wealth is taken away. As a result,
the markets impose a solvency constraint that keeps the households from defaulting: all of
a household's state-contingent promises must be backed by the cum-dividend value of its
housing owned at the end of period t, ho
t+1. In each node st, households face a separate














; for all s
t;s
0: (4)
As in Alvarez and Jermann (2000), these constraints are not too tight: they allow for the
maximal degree of risk sharing, given that agents cannot be excluded from trading, while
preventing default.
1.2 Equilibrium Asset Prices
Competitive Equilibrium. Given a distribution over initial non-labor wealth and initial





such that (i) for given prices and initial wealth, the allocation solves
each household's maximization problem (1) s.t. (2), (3) and (4), and (ii) the markets for the
consumption good, the housing services, the contingent claims and housing ownership shares
clear.
To rule out arbitrage opportunities, payo®s in each state of the world are priced by the
unconstrained agents at every date and state (Alvarez and Jermann (2000)). These uncon-


































The second equality follows directly from the form of the utility function, the de¯nition of the
expenditure ratio r = ca
½ha, and market clearing in the housing market.6 No arbitrage implies
that the return on any security j, R
j




2 Inside the Model
This section explains in detail how movements in the housing collateral ratio induce variation
in conditional asset pricing moments. To characterize the equilibrium consumption dynamics
and link these to the state prices of consumption, we use stochastic consumption weights.
This section can be skipped by readers mainly interested in the asset pricing results.
2.1 Equilibrium Consumption Dynamics and the Collateral Ratio
Following Lustig (2003), we use a simple risk-sharing rule to characterize the equilibrium
consumption choices for each household in an equivalent time zero trading environment.7
Let »t(`;st) =
Â
³t(`;st) be the cumulative Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint
(4) at time t for household (`;s0), where ³t(`;st) = 1¡
P
s¿¹st °¿(`;s¿) adds all the multipliers
° along the path leading to that node; Â is the inverse of the multiplier on the time zero
budget constraint. When the constraint does not bind, its Lagrange multiplier is zero, and
the household's cumulative multiplier remains unchanged. But when the constraint binds,
the multiplier increases to a cuto® level »
t(yt;zt). This cuto® is the consumption share at
which the collateral constraint holds with equality. Note that the cuto® only depends on the







"; 8i. Since there is one economy-




Consequently, all households equate their non-housing to housing consumption ratios r(zt).
7A separate appendix derives the equivalence of equilibria in these two trading environments if interest
rates are high enough in the sense of Alvarez and Jermann (2000). It also shows the necessary and su±cient
¯rst order conditions for the household.







»t¡1(`;st¡1) if »t¡1(`;st¡1) > »
t(yt;zt)
»
t(yt;zt) if »t¡1(`;st¡1) · »
t(yt;zt)
(6)
The aggregate weight process »a
t (zt) summarizes to what extent collateral constraints bind



















































We verify in a separately available appendix that this rule satis¯es the ¯rst order condition
for non-housing and housing consumption and the market clearing conditions. Combining
(7) and (6), when a household switches to a state with a binding constraint, its consumption




t . Shocks to »a
t (zt) re°ect aggregate shocks to the wealth distribution. Because they
follow from an inability to insure against human wealth shocks, these can be interpreted as
liquidity shocks.
Combining the risk-sharing rule (7) for unconstrained households (»t+1(`;st+1) = »t(`;st))






















For future reference, we denote the equilibrium price of a claim to some payo® stream fdg












where Mt;t+j = mt+1mt+2 :::mt+j is the j-period ahead pricing kernel.
A Benchmark Economy The perfect insurance environment provides a useful benchmark
for understanding asset prices. Because households are never constrained, the individual
multiplier stays constant at its initial value: »t(`;st) = »0(`;s0). The aggregate weight process
re°ects the initial wealth distribution and is constant: »a






Consumption shares are constant, consumption levels only move with aggregate consumption
and there is full insurance. All agents equate their IMRS and the SDF is the standard
Breeden-Lucas pricing kernel, adjusted for a composition factor that arises from the non-
separability between non-housing and housing consumption. It contains only the ¯rst two
factors in (8). As it turns out, the composition e®ect alone is unable to generate enough
variation in conditional asset pricing moments, and it generates a low unconditional equity
premium.
A Multiplicative Discount Factor Adjustment The bulk of the action comes from the
collateral e®ect instead. It does not hinge on the non-separability of preferences, but relies on
imperfect consumption insurance among heterogenous households induced by occasionally
binding collateral constraints. The third term of the SDF in (8) re°ects this departure from
perfect insurance and it measures the risk of binding solvency constraints. It is the growth
rate of the aggregate consumption weight process »a
t+1, raised to the power of risk aversion
°. When many households are severely constrained in state zt+1 (»a(zt+1) >> »a(zt)), the
price of consumption in that state is much higher, and the unconstrained households expe-
rience high marginal utility growth: When lots of households run into binding constraints
and experience consumption share increases, the unconstrained households have to experi-
ence large decreases in their consumption shares. The increase in the price of consumption
8©0 is the initial distribution of multipliers »0, a monotone transformation of the initial wealth distribution
L0.
10induces them to accept low consumption growth rates. When nobody is constrained, the
aggregate consumption weight process stays constant, »a(zt+1) = »a(zt), and the represen-
tative agent SDF re-emerges. The risk of binding solvency constraints endogenously creates
heteroscedasticity in the SDF.
Housing Collateral The novel feature of this model is that the tightness of the con-
straints, and therefore the size of the multiplicative adjustment to the SDF, depends on the




¦zt [fca + ha½g]
=
¦zt [fcar¡1g]
¦zt [fca (1 + r¡1)g]
: (9)
The numerator measures the value of collateralizable wealth; it equals the price of a claim
to the aggregate housing dividend. The denominator is the sum of collateralizable housing
wealth and non-collateralizable human wealth. If the expenditure ratio r is constant, the
collateral ratio equals 1
1+r. If r varies over time in a persistent manner, then the housing





t and therefore the amount of risk sharing that can be sustained and equilibrium
asset prices. We formalize this in the following two propositions, proven in appendix A.
If the total housing claim is su±ciently valuable, then perfect risk sharing can be sus-
tained.
Proposition 2. Let ¦¤[f¢g] denote the price of that claim under perfect risk-sharing and let














z;y [f´(y;z)g] for all (y;z) 2 Y £ Z
This condition guarantees that each household can consume the average endowment without
violating its collateral constraint. The following proposition states that an economy with
more housing collateral (lower r) has lower cuto®s », thereby allowing for more consumption
smoothing. Such an increase in the supply of collateral brings the cuto® consumption share
closer to its lower bound of zero. In the limit perfect risk-sharing obtains. Conversely, a
decrease in the supply of collateral (higher r) brings the cuto® rules closer to their upper
11bound, the labor income shares ^ ´. In the limit, as the collateral disappears, the economy
reverts to autarky (no risk sharing).
Proposition 3. Assume utility is separable and consider two economies, denoted by super-
scripts 1 and 2. If r1
¿(z¿) < r2
¿(z¿); 8z¿ ¸ zt then the cuto®s satisfy »
1(yt;zt) · »
2(yt;zt). As
r¿(z¿) ! 1 for all z¿ ¸ zt, »(yt;zt) ! ^ ´(yt;zt). Conversely, as r¿(z¿) ! 0 for all z¿ ¸ zt;
»(yt;zt) ! 0.
Di®erences in the r process a®ect the equilibrium aggregate multiplier process »a. An
economy with a uniformly lower housing collateral (higher r) process has higher liquidity
shocks and lower average interest rates (or equivalently higher average state prices):
Corollary 1. Assume utility is separable and consider two economies, 1 and 2. Fix the dis-
















, and the state prices are higher on average in the second economy.
The last proposition and corollary compare two economies with di®erent collateral processes
frg to illustrate the mechanism that underlies time-variation in the market price of risk.
Computation These aggregate weight shocks play a key role in the numerical computation
of equilibria. To solve the model numerically, we rely on an approximation of the growth




t¡1(zt¡1) using a truncated history of aggregate
shocks. This is discussed in detail in appendix B.
2.2 Two Driving Forces
To build intuition for the asset pricing results, we ¯rst explain the two main driving forces
of the model: shocks to the wealth distribution, operating at business cycle frequencies, and
variation in the housing collateral ratio, operating at low frequencies. Both of these forces
a®ect the SDF mt+1 in (8) through its third term g
°
t+1, which is a function of the aggregate





Shocks to the Wealth Distribution We build in a higher cross-sectional income dis-
persion in a low aggregate consumption growth state, a mechanism pioneered in Mankiw
12(1986) and Constantinides and Du±e (1996) (see calibration below). Because risk sharing is
imperfect, this income dispersion e®ect results in more wealth and consumption dispersion.
First, the household cuto® levels are higher in low aggregate consumption growth states,
»(yt;zt¡1;re) > »(yt;zt¡1;ex), and this makes the consumption increase for households that
switch to a state with a binding constraint larger. Second, low aggregate consumption
growth states are short-lived in our model and agents are more constrained in these states
as a result, because of their desire to smooth out its e®ect on their consumption. As the
combined result of these two forces, the size of the aggregate weight shock increases more
in low aggregate consumption growth states (gt+1(zt;re) > gt+1(zt;ex)). However, after a
low aggregate consumption growth shock accompanied by a large aggregate weight shock
gt+1, the left tail of the wealth distribution is cleansed, and subsequent aggregate weight
shocks are much smaller. This cleansing mechanism lowers the conditional market price of
risk ¾t[mt+1=Et[mt+1] and increases the interest rate after a bad shock. These wealth distri-
bution dynamics operate at business cycle frequencies and are also present in Lustig (2003).
They are a ¯rst source of heteroscedasticity in the SDF, and will allow the model to match
year-to-year variation in stock returns.
Housing Collateral Mechanism There is another source of heteroscedasticity: low fre-
quency changes in the housing collateral ratio. This paper's novel feature are movements in
the housing collateral ratio that come from exogenous movement in the non-housing expen-
diture ratio r together with endogenous movements in the SDF (equation 9). It is these low
frequency movements in the housing collateral ratio that allow the model the match asset
prices at low frequencies.
Figure 1 illustrates the collateral mechanism for a typical two hundred period simulation
of the benchmark model. The calibration is in section 3 below. Panel 1 plots the housing
collateral ratio my (bold, right axis) together with the expenditure ratio r (single line, left
axis). It shows that the housing collateral ratio increases when households spend a larger
share of income on housing. The persistence of my comes from this relationship. Panel 2
plots the cross-sectional consumption growth dispersion (single line, left axis) against the
housing collateral ratio my (bold line, right axis). It summarizes the risk sharing dynamics in
13the model. When collateral is scarce, more households run into binding collateral constraints.
To prevent default, the consumption share of the constrained households increases. At the
same time, the unconstrained households' consumption share decreases precipitously (see
equation 7). As a result, the cross-sectional standard deviation of consumption growth
increases, evidence of less risk-sharing. For example, in a period of collateral abundance
(period 126), ¾t[¢logct+1] is 8.1%, whereas in a period of collateral scarcity (period 174), it
is only 0.9%.9 The aggregate weight shock gt+1, plotted in panel 3, measures the economy-
wide extent to which the solvency constraints bind. It also governs the new component to
the SDF g
°
t+1. The panel illustrates that when collateral is scarce, constraints bind more
frequently and more severely and this is re°ected in a large aggregate weight shock. For
example, in period 126 the liquidity shock is 1.07, whereas in period 174 it is only 1.01. The
SDF is higher and more volatile in such periods of collateral scarcity, and quite di®erent
from the representative agent SDF. The next panels illustrate how this impacts asset prices.
Equity premium The fourth panel of ¯gure 1 shows that the conditional expected excess
return on a (non-levered) claim to aggregate consumption (dotted line, left axis) is higher
in periods of collateral scarcity (full line right axis). The conditional equity premium is
13.5% when my is low (period 126), but only 4.5% when the housing collateral ratio is high
(period 174). The ¯fth panel shows that the conditional volatility of the excess return on
the consumption claim (left axis) is 10.3% when collateral is abundant (period 174) and
more than doubles to 24% when collateral is scarce (period 126). The net result of the




t+1]) that is higher in times
of collateral scarcity (sixth panel). It is .34 in period 174 and almost .57 in period 126.
Figure 2 summarizes the conditional asset pricing moments somewhat di®erently. It plots
the averages of these conditional asset pricing moments against the value of the collateral
ratio. The entire time-series of conditional asset pricing moments is computed, then averaged
over histories of the aggregate state (zt¡1;¢¢¢ ;zt¡k), sorted according to whether the last
aggregate shock realization zt was high (dashed line) or low (full line), and then sorted
9As an aside, even though the consumption shares change in important ways when collateral constraints
bind, the unconditional volatility of consumption growth for an individual household is moderate. In our
benchmark model it is less than 10% of the unconditional volatility of individual income growth. There is
still a considerable amount of risk-sharing.
14Figure 1: Risk Sharing, Conditional Asset Pricing Moments and Collateral Ratio
The graphs display a two hundred period model simulation under the benchmark parametrization (see Table 1). The shocks are
the same in each panel. The ¯rst panel plots the non-housing expenditure ratio r. The second panel plots the cross-sectional
standard deviation of consumption growth across households (¾t[¢logct+1]). The third panel is the aggregate weight shock
gt+1. The fourth panel plots the equity premium predicted by the model, i.e. the expected excess return on a non-levered claim

























. Each of these series are measured against the left axis and
plotted in a single blue line. The housing collateral ratio my is measured against the right axis and plotted in a bold red line.






















































Cross−sectional StDev. of Consumption Growth











































Conditional StDev. Excess return on Equity






































according to my. Concentrating on the dashed lines, the equity premium is 9% higher when
collateral is scarce (my = .04) than when it is abundant (my = .10) in the ¯rst panel. The
other two panels in the top row match our earlier ¯ndings of higher conditional volatility and
15Sharpe ratios when collateral is scarce.10 The bottom row shows that the conditional market
price of risk ¾t[mt+1]=Et[mt+1], an upper bound on the Sharpe ratio, is higher when collateral
is scarce (panel 4). The price-dividend ratio in panel 5 is also higher when collateral is scarce
because the demand for insurance against binding solvency constraints drives up the price
of stocks. It also drives up the price of bonds. So, the model simultaneously generates a
high equity premium and a high price-dividend ratio because the risk-free rate is low when
collateral is scarce (panel 6).
These are the dynamics of asset prices that underly our main results in section 4. We
¯rst turn to the calibration of the model.
3 Calibration
There are two driving forces in the model: the income process and the non-housing expen-
diture ratio.
Income Process The ¯rst driving force in the model is the Markov process for the non-
durable endowment process. It has an aggregate and an idiosyncratic component. The
aggregate endowment growth process is taken from Mehra and Prescott (1985) and replicates
the moments of aggregate consumption growth in the 1871-1979 data. Aggregate endowment
growth, ¸, follows an autoregressive process:
¸t(zt) = ½¸¸t¡1(zt¡1) + "t;
with ½¸ = ¡:14;E(¸) = :0183 and ¾(¸) = :0357. We discretize the AR(1) process with
two aggregate growth states z = (ex;re) = [1:04;:96] (for expansion and recession) and an
aggregate state transition matrix [:83;:17;:69;:31]. The implied ratio of the probability of
a high aggregate endowment growth state to the probability of a low aggregate endowment
growth state is 2.65. The unconditional probability of a low endowment growth state is
27.4%. This matches the observed frequency of recessions.
10The non-monotonicity for low collateral ratios comes from the Chebychev approximation used to compute
policy functions.
16Figure 2: Summary Conditional Asset Pricing Moments.
This graph reports average asset pricing moments from a long model simulation under the benchmark parametrization. All series
are averaged over histories (zt¡1;¢¢¢ ;zt¡k), sorted into low zt (¸(zt) = 0:96, full line) and high zt observations (¸(zt) = 1:04,
dashed line) and plotted against the housing collateral ratio (horizontal axes). The ¯rst row of the ¯gure plots the expected
excess return on a claim to aggregate consumption (panel 1), its conditional standard deviation (panel 2) and its Sharpe ratio
(panel 3). The second row plots the conditional market price of risk (panel 4), the conditional price-dividend ratio (panel 5),
and the risk-free rate (panel 6).
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An important stylized fact about idiosyncratic labor income volatility in the US is that
it increases in recessions (Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004)). Our calibrated labor
income process is designed to capture this feature. Following Alvarez and Jermann (2001),
log labor income shares follow an AR(1) process with autocorrelation of .92, and a conditional
variance of .181 in low and .0467 in high aggregate endowment growth states. Discretization
into a four-state Markov chain results in individual income states (´1(hi;ex);´1(lo;ex)) =
[:6578;:3422] in the high and (´1(hi;re);´1(lo;re)) = [:7952;:2048] in the low aggregate
17endowment growth state.11 We refer to the counter-cyclical labor income share dispersion
as the Mankiw (1986) e®ect.
Expenditure Ratio The second driving force in the model is the process for the ratio
of non-housing to housing expenditures frg. Calibrating the expenditure ratio is equivalent
to calibrating the evolution of the aggregate housing stock fhg and imposing the intra-
temporal optimality condition. Following Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel (2006), we specify
an autoregressive process which also depends on aggregate endowment growth ¸:
logrt+1 = ¹ r + ½r logrt + br¸t+1 + ¾rºt+1; (10)
where ºt+1 is an i.i.d. standard normal process with mean zero, orthogonal to ¸t+1. In our
benchmark calibration we set ½r = :96, br = :93 and ¾r = :03. The parameter values come
from estimating equation (10) on US data.12 We discretize the process for log(r) as a ¯ve-
state Markov process. A second calibration switches o® the e®ect of consumption growth
by setting br = 0. Both calibrations ¯x ¾r = :03. We choose the constant ¹ r to match the
average housing expenditure share of 19% in the data (NIPA, 1929 to 2004).
Average Housing Collateral Ratio A key quantitative question is whether collateral is
su±ciently scarce for our borrowing constraints to have a large e®ect. Because this question
is an important one, we consider two measures to calibrate the average ratio of collateral
wealth to total wealth. The ¯rst measure focuses on housing collateral, the second measure
includes non-housing sources of collateral.
We measure factor payments to housing wealth as total US rental income and factor
payments to human wealth as labor income (compensation of employees). NIPA data show
that rental income was 3.4% of rental income plus labor income in 1946-2002 and 4.3% in
1929-2002. Because the factor payments ratio maps directly into the housing collateral ratio,
11The one di®erence with the Storesletten et al. (2004) calibration is that recessions are shorter in our
calibration. In their paper the economy is in the low aggregate endowment growth state half of the time.
That implies that the unconditional variance of our labor income process is lower.
12Table 1 in a separate appendix shows regression estimates for ½r and br.
18the data suggest a housing collateral ratio less than 5%.13
Even though non-housing wealth is less collateralizable, our second estimate is a broad
collateral measure. It includes ¯nancial wealth, the market value of the non-farm non-
¯nancial corporate sector in the US. We add interest payments and dividend payments to
the income stream from collateralizable wealth and we add proprietary income to the income
stream from non-collateralizable wealth. The factor payment ratio increases to 8.6% in the
post-war sample and 9.4% in the full sample (row 2), suggesting a housing collateral ratio
less than 10%.
An alternative approach is to compare the collateralizable wealth to income ratio in
model and data. Assuming that the expected return on total collateralizable assets is 9%
and the expected dividend growth rate is 3%, then a collateral ratio of 5% implies a collateral
wealth-to-income ratio of 85% according to Gordon's growth formula: :85 = :05=(:09¡:03).
Likewise, the implied wealth-to-income ratio is 150% when the collateral ratio is 10%. In
US data, the 1929-2004 average ratio of mortgages to income is 55%. If we include ¯nancial
wealth, that ratio increases to 155%. This approach also points towards a housing collateral
ratio of 5% and a broad collateral ratio of 10%.14 Our benchmark calibration (my = 0:05)
produces a collateralizable wealth-to-income ratio of 96%. Section C in the appendix explains
that a higher my implies a lower wealth/income ratio in the model, through its e®ect on the
risk-free rate.
We take the model with a 5% collateral ratio as our benchmark and consider the econ-
omy with a 10% collateral ratio as an alternative. To simultaneously match the average
expenditure share of housing services (¹ r) of 19% and the average ratio of housing wealth to
total wealth (my) of 5% or 10%, we scale up the aggregate non-housing endowment.
Preference Parameters In the benchmark calibration, we use additive utility with dis-
count rate ± = :95, coe±cient of relative risk aversion ° = 8, and intratemporal elasticity
of substitution between non-housing and housing consumption " = :05. We ¯x the relative
13If r is constant, the housing collateral ratio or the ratio of housing wealth to total wealth is
1=r
1+1=r =
1=(1+ r). This is a very good approximation for the average collateral ratio in the model with stochastic r.
14The Gordon growth model is an approximation. Appendix C provides a detailed analysis of this asset
value approach to calibrating the collateral share.
19weight on housing in the utility function Ã = 1 throughout.15 Because our goal is to explain
conditional moments of the market return, we choose the parameter ° to match the uncondi-
tional market risk premium. We also compute the model for ° 2 f2;5;10g and " 2 f:15;:75g.












In NIPA data (1930-2004), the left hand side of (11) is .046 and the right-hand side is .041.
The implied " is .098. By choosing a low ", we impose that rental prices are consistent with
the expenditure ratio. A choice for " closer to one helps to generate a higher average equity
premium and lower risk-free rate, at the cost of excessive rental price volatility.
Stock Market Return We de¯ne the stock market return as the return on a leveraged
claim to the aggregate consumption process fca
tg and denote it by Rl. In the data, dividends
are more volatile than aggregate consumption. We choose leverage parameter · = 3, where
¾(¢logdt+1) = ·¾(¢logca
t+1).16 We also price a non-levered claim on the aggregate con-
sumption stream, denoted Rc. The excess returns, in excess of a risk-free rate, are denoted
Rl;e and Rc;e. Table 1 summarizes the benchmark parametrization and the other values we
consider in the sensitivity analysis.
Computation Our computational strategy is to keep track of cross-sectional distributions
over wealth and endowments that change over time. Appendix B provides the algorithm.
4 Model Meets Twentieth Century Data
We explore the model's long-run predictions, using the last seven decades in the US as a
testing ground. The value of housing wealth to income shifts dramatically over this period.
15The Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion ¡cucc
uc = ( rt
1+rt)° + ( 1
1+rt)"¡1 is a linear combination
of ° and " with weights depending on the non-durable expenditure ratio rt. In the simulations r = 4:26 on
average, so that the weight on ° is .81 on average. Because rt is not very volatile, neither is the degree of
risk aversion.
16For the period 1930-2004, the volatility of annual nominal dividend growth is 14.8%, whereas the volatil-
ity of annual nominal consumption growth (non-durables and services excluding housing services) is 5.6%, a
ratio of 2.6.
20Table 1: Parameter Calibration












At the onset of the Great Depression, the mortgage-to-income ratio increases from 25 percent
to 50 percent because house prices do not decline as quickly as national income. The ratio
subsequently decreases to a minimum of 12 percent by the end of WW-II. After that, the
ratio increases almost without interruption to a value of 100 percent today. We focus on
three key features of the data: (i) the decline in the volatility of returns and the risk-free rate,
(ii) the low-frequency variation in the average risk-free rate, and (iii) the long-run decline
in the equity premium since WW-II. Taking as given the observed evolution of the housing
collateral ratio, the model replicates all three features.
We use two distinct measures of the housing collateral stock: the value of outstanding
home mortgages (MO) and the market value of residential real estate wealth (RW). The
data are from the Historical Statistics for the US (Bureau of the Census) for the period
1889-1945 and from the Flow of Funds (Federal Board of Governors) for 1945-2001. We use
both the value of mortgages and the total value of residential wealth to allow for changes
in the extent to which housing can be used as a collateral asset. National income is labor
income plus net transfer income from the Historical Statistics of the US for 1926-1930 and
from the National Income and Product Accounts for 1930-2001.17
17The data appendix in Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) provides detailed sources.
21We feed the observed aggregate consumption growth shocks and the observed housing
collateral ratio between 1929 and 2003 into the model. To match the frequency of recessions
in the data, we de¯ne a recession as a year in which aggregate consumption growth drops
one standard deviation below its sample mean. We use both measures of the collateral ratio:
mortgages to national income, MOt
Yt , and residential wealth to national income RWt
Yt . We
equate the percentage deviations of fMOt
Yt g and fRWt
Yt g from their sample average in the data
to the percentage deviations of my in the model by feeding in the right rt process.
Declining Risk Premium and Risk-free Rate Volatility The ¯rst panel of Table 2
documents a stunning long-run decrease in the volatilities of excess stock market returns
and risk-free rates. The standard deviation of excess stock returns declines from 30% in the
1930s to 10% in the 1990s, while the standard deviation of the risk-free rate declines from
around 7% to 2%. While in°ation was more volatile in the early decades, the volatility of
the risk-free rate cannot be accounted for by in°ation surprises alone. The second column
(¾(r
f
ex¡post)) reports annual risk-free rates computed from annualizing the di®erence between
the monthly three-month T-bill rate minus the in°ation rate in the same month. The
third column subtracts the previous month's in°ation rate instead (¾(r
f
ex¡ante)). The small
di®erence between the two suggests this volatility is not exclusively due to in°ation surprises.
Most asset pricing models target a stable risk-free rate, but the stability of the risk-free rate
is a recent phenomenon. Our model can account for this radical decline in volatility.
The model matches the volatility decline in returns. In the benchmark calibration (panel
2 of Figure 2), the standard deviation of the return on an un-levered claim to aggregate
consumption declines from 36% percent in the 1930s to 12% in the 1990s when we use the
mortgage-based collateral measure (column 1); it declines from 23% to 12% for the residential
wealth-based measure (column 3). The model also delivers a steep decline in risk-free rate
volatility: from 21% to 11% in column 2 and from 16% to 11% in column 4. While this
decline is consistent with the data, the model induces too much volatility in the risk-free
rate. A modi¯ed version of our model with Epstein and Zin (1991)-type preferences mitigates
this problem.18 An increase in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to 0.2 from .125,
18The details of the model with Epstein-Zin preferences are available in a separate appendix.
22while keeping the risk aversion coe±cient constant at its benchmark value of 8, allows us to
roughly match the volatility. Panel 3 shows that the risk-free volatility now declines from
10% to 3%, in line with the data. At the same time, this model preserves the steep decline
in the stock return volatility: from 29% to 4%.
Level of the Risk-free Rate The risk-free rate is low when housing collateral is scarce,
both in the model and in the data, because the demand for insurance pushes up the price
of future consumption. To focus on the long-run dynamics we compute the 9-year moving
average of the one-year risk-free rate in the data and in the model. The top row of Figure
3 plots the data, the bottom row plots the model-generated data; the left panel uses the
mortgage-based measure and the right panel uses the residential wealth-based measure.
The data reveal a strong positive correlation between the long-run risk-free rate and the
housing collateral measure: 0.75 in the left panel and 0.83 in the right panel. The initial
increase in housing collateral in the late 1920s coincides with an increase in the risk-free rate.
At the start of the 1930s, the risk-free rate declines precipitously and this decline coincides
with a decline in the housing collateral ratio. During WW-II, the federal government did
keep real interest rates arti¯cially low. In the post-war period, the two series continue to
co-move until the mid-1990s.
The model produces a similar low-frequency pattern for the risk-free rate. The bottom
row of Figure 3 shows that the model predicts the decline in the risk-free rate in the Great
Depression, the increase in the late 1940s, the decline in the 1960s, the rise in the 1970s,
and the decline in the 1980s and early 1990s. Since the mid-1990s, the model predicts an
increase in the risk-free rate because housing collateral has become more abundant. One
notable divergence is that the increase in housing collateral in the last 10 years did not lead
to a commensurate increase in the interest rate.19
Equity Premium Finally, our model generates a long-run decline in the equity premium
as well as large unexpected return in the 1990s. Many authors have argued that the equity
premium has declined substantially over the last four decades. Jagannathan et al. (2000)
19We conjecture that this may be due to the unprecedented out°ow of tradeable wealth from the US in
the last decade. This is a topic for future research; the current model abstracts from this.
23Figure 3: Time-Variation in Risk-free rate: Data and Model.
The two plots in the ¯rst row of the ¯gure plot the 9-year moving average of the annual T-bill rate and the
collateral ratio in the data (dashed line). In the left panel the housing collateral ratio is measured as the
percentage deviation of the mortgage-based collateral measure from its long-run trend (MO=Y ). The right
panel uses the residential wealth-based collateral measure (RW=Y ). The annual risk-free rate is computed
from monthly de°ated T-Bill returns: r
f
t;t+1 = 12 £ ((1 + it;t+1)(1=12) ¡ (1 + ¼t;t+1)), where i is the annual
nominal holding period return on 3-month T-bills from CRSP and ¼ is the monthly in°ation computed from
the BLS consumer price index. The panels in the second row plot the same statistics for the benchmark
model. I.e., we feed in the observed aggregate consumption growth and housing collateral data and compute
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use Gordon's growth formula to back out the equity premium and conclude it has declined
from 8% in the 1940s to 1% in the 1990s. Fama and French (2002) argue that, because of
24a decrease in the equity premium, capital gains were much higher than expected, especially
in the 1990s. Because housing collateral became more abundant since the 1940s, our model






) declines from 10.6% in the 1940s and a high of 11.2% in the
1960s to 5.5% in the 2000s (¯rst column of Table 3). The model also generates the large
unexpected capital gains of the 1990s. The second column reports the sample average of the
realized excess return in each decade, E[Re
t+1]. The realized return in the 1990s is 15.4%,
much higher than the equity premium of 7.5%.
The decade-by-decade averages somewhat understate the extent of the decline in the
equity premium. The left panel on the top row of Figure 4 contrasts the low and the high
frequency variation by plotting the model-predicted annual equity premium (dashed line)
alongside the 9-year moving-average (solid line). The vertical bars denote recession years.
The equity premium is always higher at the onset of a recession. The equity premium peaks
at 15% in the early 1940s, while it reaches a low of 3.5% in 2002. At the same time, the
conditional volatility of excess stock returns declines from a high of 25% in the early 1930 to
a low of 15% in 2002 (left panel on the middle row). Over the same period, the conditional
Sharpe ratio declines from .70 to .35 (left panel bottom row).
The predicted variation in conditional excess return moments looks similar to the data.
The right panels of ¯gure 4 plot the empirical counterpart to the equity premium, the
conditional volatility and the conditional Sharpe ratio of excess returns. To construct these
measures, we project realized excess stock return and its realized volatility (constructed
from daily data) on the housing collateral measure and the real risk-free rate. Because the
housing collateral ratio is slow-moving, we can interpret the projected series as capturing a
long-run equity premium and long-run conditional volatility. The conditional Sharpe ratio
is the ratio. The equity premium also peaks in the early 1940s around 15% and declines to
5% at the end of the sample (top right panel). The conditional volatility also goes from 25%
to 15% (middle panel), and the Sharpe ratio falls by more than half (bottom panel).
255 Time-Varying Asset Returns
To conclude, we show that the model captures two more important features of conditional
asset pricing moments: (i) the same return predictability as in the data, and, (ii) highly
volatile Sharpe ratios. At the end of this section, we summarize our ¯ndings for unconditional
asset price moments.
Long Horizon Predictability If expected returns are vary over time with the housing
collateral ratio, then we should ¯nd that the housing collateral ratio predicts returns. An
important question is whether the model can quantitatively replicate the predictability coef-
¯cients found in the data. Panel 1 of table 4 shows results from predictability regressions of
long-horizon excess returns on the lagged housing collateral scarcity measure in the data.20
Results are reported for horizons up to 8 years and for two samples, and are taken from
Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005). The main ¯ndings are that excess returns are higher
when collateral is scarce (b1 > 0). The e®ect becomes larger and statistically more signi¯cant
with the horizon and the R2 increases. Panel 2 shows that the model replicates the pattern
of predictability coe±cients surprisingly well. It reports regression results inside the model
of excess returns on our measure of housing collateral ratio scarcity. When housing collateral
is scarce (my is low), the excess return is high. The magnitude of the slope coe±cients is
close to the one we ¯nd in the data. Moreover, the R2 of the predictability regression in-
crease with the predictability horizon, just as in the data. We ¯nd this negative relationship
between myt and the excess return for a non-levered claim, as well as for a levered claim to
aggregate consumption (· = 3).
Sharpe Ratio in the Data Does the model generate enough volatility in the Sharpe
ratio and does the Sharpe ratio co-move correctly with the housing collateral ratio? To
evaluate our model against the data, we estimate the Sharpe ratio on annual data from
20Collateral scarcity is measured as f myt =
max(myt)¡myt
max(myt)¡min(myt), where max(myt) and min(myt) are the
sample maximum and minimum of fmytg. This ratio is always between 0 and 1. The measure is based on
outstanding residential mortgages. Collateral is scarcer when myt is lower. The housing collateral ratio myt is
estimated as the residual from a cointegration relationship between MO and Y , and is therefore a stationary
variable. Details are provided in Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) and the data are downloadable from
the authors' web sites.
261927-1992 and compare it to the variation in the Sharpe ratio generated by the model. The
conditional mean return is the projection of the excess return on the housing collateral ratio,
the dividend yield and the ratio of aggregate labor income to consumption, all of which have
been shown to forecast annual returns.21 Likewise, the conditional volatility is the projection
of the standard deviation of intra-year monthly returns on the same predictors. We form
the Sharpe ratio as the ratio of the predicted excess returns and predicted volatility. Table
5 shows the estimation results for 1 year returns (column 1), but also for 5 year and 10-year
cumulative excess returns (columns 2 and 3). The last three rows of the table indicate the
unconditional mean and standard deviation of the Sharpe ratio as well as its correlation with
the housing collateral ratio. In the estimation, the correlation between the Sharpe ratio and
the measure of collateral scarcity f my is positive in the data and equal to .25, .32, and .50
for 1, 5 and 10 year cumulative excess returns. The volatility of the Sharpe ratio on 1, 5
and 10 year cumulative excess returns is .10, .18, and .20. Lettau and Ludvigson (2003)
even report a volatility of .45 for quarterly returns between 1952 and 2000. Similar to the
data, our model generates volatile Sharpe ratios, and Sharpe ratios that co-move correctly
with the housing collateral ratio. The correlation between the Sharpe ratio and f my is also
positive: .50, .59 and .39 for 1, 5 and 10 year cumulative excess returns on a non-levered
consumption claim. The unconditional Sharpe ratio volatility is .40, .42, .40. Other models
have a hard time generating this much volatility. For example, the unconditional standard
deviation of the Sharpe ratio is .09 for the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) model and the
consumption volatility model of Lettau and Ludvigson (2003). The volatility of the Sharpe
ratio in the representative agent model is even smaller.
Unconditional Asset Pricing Moments Finally, Appendix D discusses the model's
unconditional asset pricing moments reported in Table 6. The model matches the mean
equity premium and its volatility, the mean Sharpe ratio, and the mean risk-free rate for
the benchmark parametrization. A representative agent economy is unable to deliver these
results, even if preferences are non-separable between housing and non-housing consumption.
Our model has one major drawback: it generates too much volatility in the risk-free rate.
21See Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), and Santos and Veronesi (2006)
respectively.
27We show that a modest increase in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution goes a long
way towards mitigating this problem. Furthermore, the lower volatility of the risk-free rate
in the post-war era masks an important, and often overlooked stylized fact: The volatility of
the risk-free rate has changed substantially from decade to decade in the US. We argued in
section 4 that this is not simply a measurement issue due to changes in in°ation volatility, and
we showed that our model is consistent with this long-run decline in risk-free rate volatility.
6 Conclusion
Our paper shows how endogenous, state-contingent borrowing constraints interact with the
housing market to deliver plausible asset pricing predictions. Equilibrium changes in the
value of the housing stock change the degree to which risk sharing takes place. The housing
collateral mechanism, in combination with wealth distribution shocks, endogenously gener-
ates time-varying volatility in the Sharpe ratio on equity. When confronted with the actual
aggregate consumption growth and housing collateral ratio series, the model delivers the
same low frequency changes in the level and volatility of the equity premium and the risk-
free rate than those we document in the data. It generates the same predictability patterns
and volatile Sharpe ratios as in the data.
This paper is part of a broader research agenda. In Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006a),
we show that the same model is also able to deliver a quantitatively meaningful return spread
on book-to-market sorted portfolios and link this feature to the term structure of equity
risk premia. In Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006b), we test the model's risk sharing
implications using quantity data only. We show that regional consumption growth in the
US is more cross-correlated when the housing collateral supply increases. Conversely, less
risk sharing takes place when collateral is scarce. This ¯nding o®ers direct support for the
collateral mechanism.
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32A Technical Appendix
This section contains the proofs of the propositions in the main text. For more details on the model
(de¯nition of the cumulative multipliers, derivation and optimality of the risk sharing rule and the
optimality of the law of motion for the cumulative multipliers), we refer the reader to section 2 of
the separate appendix to this paper, available on our web sites.
Condition 1 Section 2 in the separate appendix explains the equivalence between the static
and sequential budget constraints and solvency constraints. This equivalence holds only if interest
rates are high enough (see Alvarez and Jermann (2000)). We impose the following condition. Let
´max denote the highest possible labor endowment realization in each future, aggregate node zt.
Condition 1. Interest rates are said to be high enough if
¦z0;y0[f´maxg] < 1;
This is the equivalent of the condition in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) that interest rates be
high enough, translated to an economy with a continuum of consumers. In an economy with a
¯nite number of agents, it is su±cient to require the time zero value of a claim to the aggregate
endowment to be ¯nite, but here it is not su±cient for the value of a claim to the average endowment
to be ¯nite. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2 Denote the price of a claim under perfect risk-sharing by ¦¤[f¢g].












for all (y;z;r) with nonzero measure; © is the joint measure de¯ned on P(Y ) £ P(Z) £ B(R).
If this condition is satis¯ed, each household can get a constant and equal share of the aggregate
non-durable and housing endowment at all future nodes. That immediately implies that perfect
risk-sharing is feasible. If there is a value rmax such that any r0 > rmax is measure zero, then










z;y [f´(y;z)g] for all (y;z) 2 Y £ Z
This condition is su±cient, but not necessary. ¤




for a household who enters the period with weight » . The cuto® rule
»(yt;zt) is determined such that the solvency constraint binds exactly: ¦y;zt [f´g] = C(»;yt;zt),



















and »0 is determined by the cuto® rule (6). Note that the stochastic discount factor mt+1(zt+1)
does not depend on rt(zt) because we assumed that utility is separable. This also implies that the
cost of a claim to labor income ¦y;zt [f´g] does not depend on r.
We prove the result for a ¯nite horizon version of this economy. We ¯rst assume some arbitrary
state prices fpt(stjs0)g for both of these economies. fmt(zt)g denotes the SDF process implied
by these state prices. Finally, we use Ti to denote the operator that maps the aggregate weight
functions f»a
t (zt)g we start with into a new aggregate function f»
0;a
t (zt)g.














































T¡1(zT¡1) , this implies
that `1;c(yT¡1;zT¡1) < `2;c(yT¡1;zT¡1) for all (yT¡1;zT¡1). By backward induction we get that,





, `1;c(yt;zt) < `2;c(yt;zt) for all nodes (yt;zt) in the ¯nite horizon










) for all zt, with strict inequality if




























t (zt) is non-decreasing in »(yt;zt). The proof extends to the in¯nite horizon economy if the
















t(stjs0) is the representative agent state price. So if we start with the equilibrium state
prices for the second economy fp2





















t (zt)?g) = f»
1;a
t (zt)?g < T2(f»
1;a
t (zt)?g);
if we start with the equilibrium prices in the ¯rst economy. Now, it can be shown that Ti(f»0
t(zt)g) ·
Ti(f»t(zt)g) if f»0









t (zt)?g and T1(f»
1;a
t (zt)?g) = f»
1;a
t (zt)?g;









Proof of Corollary 1 Follows from the de¯nition of the cuto® level in the previous proof. For


















. This follows directly from the de¯nition of the aggregate
weight shock (12). As a result, »a
t (zt) is non-decreasing in »(yt;zt). This implies the state prices at
time 0 for consumption to be delivered in st are higher, and this is true for all nodes st.
Interest rates between time zero and time t are given by R
f
0;t = E0[M0;t]¡1, where the pricing





time t in all nodes st implies a lower pricing kernel on average and higher interest rates on average.
¤
B Computing Stationary Equilibria
In this appendix we show how to compute stationary equilibria. As we noted in section 2, the
aggregate weight shock depends on the entire history of aggregate shocks z1. To avoid the curse
of dimensionality, we follow Lustig (2003) and truncate aggregate histories. Households only keep
track of the last k lags of the aggregate state, zk
t = (zt;zt¡1;¢¢¢ ;zt¡k), and the current expenditure
ratio rt(zt). The current expenditure ratio rt contains additional information not present in the
truncated history zk
t , namely rt¡k. We use R to denote the ergodic set for the process r. For a
household starting the period with weight » 2 ¥, the policy function l(y0;z0;»;r;zk) : ¥£R£Zk !
R produces the new individual weight in state (y0;z0). There is one policy function l(¢) for each
pair (y0;z0) 2 Y £Z. The policy function g¤(z0;r;zk) : R£Zk ! R forecasts the aggregate weight
shock when moving to state z0 after history (zk;r).
Competitive Equilibrium. A stationary stochastic equilibrium is a time invariant distribution
©¤
(r;zk) (»;y) over individual weights, individual endowments, current expenditure ratio, and trun-























is the transition function induced by the policy functions. The forecast of the











; 8z0 2 Z:
Intertemporal prices are pinned down by the stochastic discount factor in equation (8), using
the forecasted shock g¤(¢) as an approximation to the actual g(¢). For any given realization fzg,
the actual aggregate weight shock g(¢) di®ers from the forecast g¤(¢) because the distribution over
individual weights and endowments ©¤(¢) di®ers from the actual distribution ©(¢), which depends on
z1. The de¯nition of a stationary equilibrium implies that, on average, across aggregate histories,
©¤(¢) = ©(¢) and markets clear: The di®erence between actual consumption and consumption
based on a truncated history is zero on average, but not state-by-state. In each state z0, the
approximation error equals the percentage di®erence between the actual aggregate weight shock
and aggregate weight shock based on a truncated history:




This is the di®erence between consumption and the endowment. As the truncation parameter
k increases, the approximation error decreases because market clearing holds on average in long
histories. We use k = 5 lags in all our computations. The percentage allocation errors in (13)
provide a clear measure of the closeness to the actual equilibrium. For our benchmark calibration,
the average error in a simulation of 10,000 periods is only 0.0011 with standard deviation .0035.
The largest error in absolute value is 0.0282.
We compute the approximating equilibrium as follows. The aggregate weight shock process is
initialized at the full insurance value (g¤ = 1) and the corresponding stochastic discount factor is
computed. The cuto® rule for the individual weight shocks ensure that the solvency constraints
hold with equality. Then we generate a panel of data by simulating the model: fztgT
t=1 for T =
10;000 and fytgT






as the household's identifying label » (the re-scaling keeps the state variables
stationary), and compute the sample mean of the aggregate weight shock fg¤
t(z0;r;zk)gT
t=1 and the
resulting stochastic discount factor fm¤
t(z0;r;zk)gT
t=1. A new cut-o® rule is computed with these
new forecasts. These two steps are iterated on until convergence.
36C Asset Value Approach to Calibrating Housing Col-
lateral Ratio
In the main text we used factor payments on collateralizable and non collateralizable wealth to
calibrate the housing collateral ratio. Those data were taken from Table 1.12. National Income by
Type of Income (NIPA), except for the net interest series which comes from Table 1.13 (net interest
paid by domestic corporations, line 8). Here we describe a second approach, based on measuring
collateral wealth directly. More precisely, we compare the ratio of collateral wealth to total income
in the model and in the data.
We start by measuring the collateral wealth-to-income ratio in the data. Housing collateral
wealth is measured as the market value of outstanding mortgages. The residential mortgage series
is from the Flow of Funds Tables and is available for the post-war period. Over that period, the
average ratio of residential mortgages to labor income plus rental income is 0.55. Financial wealth
is measured as the market value of non-farm non-¯nancial corporations in the US This series is
constructed based on Flow of Funds data; Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006c) provides the
details. Our broad measure of total collateral wealth to total income is constructed as the ratio
of residential mortgages plus ¯nancial wealth to labor income plus interest income plus dividend
income plus proprietor's income. That ratio is 1.55 in post-war data.
We compare these numbers to the housing collateral wealth-to-income ratio in the model. More
precisely, we ¯x an average housing collateral ratio my, simulate the model for a long period, and
compute the housing wealth to total income ratio. When my = 0:05, the collateral wealth to
income ratio is 0.90, in between the narrow and the broad empirical measure.
What is the e®ect of a higher housing collateral ratio in the model? When my is higher than
0.05, the collateral wealth-to-income ratio is actually lower than 0.90. To understand this, consider








where R is the expected rate of return on total wealth and g is the growth rate of total income. The
numerator is e®ectively the housing collateral ratio, for example 0.075. In the denominator, the
aggregate endowment growth rate g is the same across calibrations. Not so for the discount rate
R. This discount rate is the sum of the risk premium on a claim to aggregate consumption (the
equity premium) and the risk-free rate. In an economy with more collateral, the equity premium
goes down, but the interest rate goes up. This interest rate e®ect dominates the risk premium
e®ect, so that the denominator is increasing in my. It does not help to increase my to generate a
large collateral wealth to total income ratio. We ¯nd a higher wealth to income ratio of 0.96 for
my = 0:035 than the 0.90 for my = 0:05 and the 0.84 for my = 0:075.
The main point is that, with a ¯ve percent collateral ratio, our benchmark model allows for a
lot of collateral: 90% of the value of national income on average.
37D Unconditional Asset Pricing Moments
The model succeeds in matching most unconditional asset pricing moments, when we set ° equal
to eight, except for the volatility of the risk-free rate.
Risk Premium Table 6 compares the unconditional ¯rst and second moments of asset returns
in US data (panel 1), in the collateral model (panels 2 and 4), and in the representative agent model
(panel 3). The benchmark calibration in panel 2 generates a 8.6% risk premium on an un-levered
equity claim, with a volatility of 21.7%. These numbers line up with the 7.9% excess return in the
data and its 20.7% volatility. The Sharpe ratio is 0.397, close to the 0.384 Sharpe ratio observed
in 1927-2004. Because consumption growth is less volatile in the data than dividend growth, we
also compute a levered claim to aggregate consumption in the model (· = 3). The model with
lower risk aversion (° = 5) now also generates a sizeable and volatile (levered) risk premium: 3.9%
expected excess return with 16.7% standard deviation. We contrast this with a representative agent
economy. The equity premium on an un-levered (levered) consumption claim is less than one-third
(one-half) as big as in the collateral model, even though preferences are non-separable between
non-housing and housing consumption. Finally, doubling the collateral ratio to 10% brings this
economy closer to the representative agent economy because the solvency constraints are looser.
The expected excess return on a levered consumption claim is still high (5.7%) and volatile (21%)
for (° = 8;" = :05).
Risk-free Rate The model with ° = 8 (° = 5) generates an average risk free rate of 2.6%
(7.7%), close to the 1.9% in the 1871-1979 data. The risk of binding collateral constraints increases
the expected SDF more when risk aversion ° is high, and pushes down the risk-free rate. There
are two reasons for this fall in the risk-free rate: Households cannot borrow as much, and they
accumulate more precautionary savings. When households are more risk averse, the precautionary
motive is stronger. They bid up the price of risk-free assets which provide insurance against the
risk of binding constraints. In contrast, the risk-free rate increases with ° in the representative
agent economy (panel 3). A more risk-averse representative agent is less willing to substitute inter-
temporally and wants to borrow more against growing labor income; this drives up the risk-free
rate. The level of the risk-free rate is much too high: 15.8% in the benchmark calibration.
The biggest shortcoming of the collateral model is the high unconditional volatility of the risk-
free rate. It is 7% in the economy with ° = 5, 15.6% in the economy with ° = 8, but only 4.2% in the
1927-2002 data and 5.2% in the 1871-1979 data. When the average collateral ratio is 10% instead,
the risk-free rate is higher but less volatile (panel 4). Two forces drive this volatility: variation in the
expected fraction of households facing binding constraints due to shocks to the wealth distribution
(at higher frequencies), and shocks to the risk-sharing technology due to changes in value of housing
collateral (at lower frequencies). Both modulate the demand for insurance. While our benchmark
calibration generates more risk-free rate volatility that other heterogenous agent models (e.g., 5% in
Alvarez and Jermann (2001) and ?), these models typically don't generate time-variation in equity
38premia because their market prices of risk are constant. As we emphasized in section 4, risk-free
rates are far from constant. Our model generates a large decline in the risk-free rate volatility
between the 1930s and the 1990s, a pattern consistent with the data.
Sensitivity: Recursive Utility One way to mitigate the risk-free rate volatility is to use
recursive preferences to de-couple risk aversion from the willingness to substitute consumption
over time. Modestly raising the intertemporal elasticity of substitution from 0.0125 to 0.20, while
keeping ° = 8, reduces the volatility of the risk-free rate from 15.6% to 6.9% (panel 5). The equity
premium is still 4.9% with a volatility of 19.5%.The separate appendix reports more detailed results.
Sensitivity: Composition E®ect A higher intratemporal elasticity of substitution (") in-
creases the equity premium and the Sharpe ratio and lowers the risk-free rate (panel 6). This e®ect
also shows up in the representative agent economy; Piazzesi et al. (2006) refer to it as a negative
composition e®ect. Assets that pay o® in low non-housing expenditure share growth states are risky
as such states occur in recessions. An increase in " from .05 to .75 increases the equity premium
by 4% and decreases the risk-free rate by 4% in both our model and the representative agent econ-
omy. Detailed results for the representative agent economy are available upon request. However,
these empirically plausible return moments come at the expense of an implausibly high rental price
growth volatility. For " = :75, the rental price growth volatility ¾(¢log½) is 19% per annum (see
equation 11), whereas observed rental price growth volatility is below 5%.Driving " even closer to 1
leads to exponentially increasing rental price growth volatility. For " > 1 the representative agent
model generates a negative equity premium. We choose " = :05 for our benchmark calibration
because the rental price growth volatility then matches the data. A higher " also increases risk-free
rate volatility.
Sensitivity: Risk Aversion, Expenditure Share, and Income Heteroscedasticity
Varying the coe±cient of relative risk aversion ° from 2 to 10 (panel 7) increases the equity premium
on a levered (non-levered) consumption claim from 0.8% to 15.7% (.3% to 13.3%). The Sharpe ratio
increases from .07 to 0.55. The risk-free rate falls from 8.6% to -2.1%. When the expenditure share
does not depend on consumption growth (br = 0 in the speci¯cation of r), the housing collateral
ratio becomes less volatile. The equity risk premium is now 6.9% with volatility 23.7%. The risk-
free rate is 1.8%, and its volatility is 3% lower than in the benchmark model (panel 8). Finally,
we shut down the Mankiw (1986) mechanism by having income shocks with the same dispersion
in booms as in recessions (panel 9). The housing collateral mechanism alone generates a sizeable
5.7% equity premium. The risk-free rate is 5% higher, but 5% less volatile.
39Table 2: Decade-by-Decade Volatility of Asset Returns.
Panel 1 reports the volatility of excess stock returns and the risk-free rate in the data. Re is the excess return on the CRSP value-
weighted stock index. The nominal risk-free rate it;t+1 is the annual return on the CRSP 3-month T-bill rate. In°ation ¼t;t+1 is
computed from the BLS consumer price index series. Column 1 reports the annualized standard deviation of excess stock returns,
computed as the sample standard deviation of monthly excess returns, where Re
t+1 = 12£((1+Rt;t+1)¡(1+it;t+1)1=12). The
second column reports the annualized standard deviation of the ex-post risk-free rate r
f
t;ex¡post = 12£((1+it;t+1)(1=12) ¡(1+
¼t;t+1)). To minimize the e®ect of in°ation surprises, column 3 reports the annualized standard deviation of an ex-ante risk-free
rate which subtracts out the previous month's in°ation rate instead: r
f
t;ex¡ante = 12 £ ((1 + it;t+1)(1=12) ¡ (1 + ¼t¡1;t)). To
compute decade-averages, we only use the last month in each year. Panel 2 reports the same statistics for the model under the
benchmark parametrization. The model-simulated data were generated by feeding in observed aggregate consumption growth
fztgT=2000
t=1929 and the observed collateral ratio, measured either based on mortgages f MOt
Yt gT=2000
t=1929 or on residential wealth
f RWt
Yt gT=2000
t=1929 . If aggregate consumption growth at t is one standard deviation below the mean, zt is the low consumption
growth state, else zt is classi¯ed as the high consumption growth state. This procedure matches the unconditional probability
of a low aggregate consumption growth in the model to that in the data. In the model, Re is the excess return on an un-levered
claim to aggregate consumption. Panel 3 reports the same statistics as panel 2, but for a model with Epstein and Zin (1991)
preferences. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to 0.2 and the coe±cient of relative risk aversion is held at its








1931-1940 0:31 0:06 0:07
1941-1950 0:13 0:08 0:10
1951-1960 0:10 0:03 0:04
1961-1970 0:12 0:02 0:02
1971-1980 0:15 0:02 0:03
1981-1990 0:15 0:03 0:02
1991-2000 0:11 0:01 0:02









1931-1940 0:36 0:21 0:23 0:16
1941-1950 0:33 0:26 0:43 0:22
1951-1960 0:18 0:19 0:17 0:17
1961-1970 0:10 0:12 0:08 0:15
1971-1980 0:16 0:15 0:16 0:16
1981-1990 0:14 0:14 0:16 0:14
1991-2000 0:12 0:11 0:12 0:11









1931-1940 0:29 0:10 0:25 0:07
1941-1950 0:17 0:10 0:27 0:08
1951-1960 0:09 0:08 0:09 0:07
1961-1970 0:07 0:04 0:04 0:05
1971-1980 0:08 0:06 0:08 0:06
1981-1990 0:05 0:05 0:09 0:05
1991-2000 0:04 0:03 0:06 0:04
40Table 3: Decade-by-Decade Equity Premium.




t+1 is the excess return on an un-levered claim to aggregate consumption. We report the sample average of the conditional
expected excess return b E(Et[Re
t+1]) and the sample average of the realized excess return b E(Re
t+1) for each decade. The model-
simulated data were generated by feeding in observed aggregate consumption growth fztgT=2000
t=1929 and the observed collateral
ratio, measured either based on mortgages f MOt
Yt gT=2000










1931-1940 0:097 0:175 0:080 0:093
1941-1950 0:097 0:055 0:092 0:093
1951-1960 0:106 0:086 0:101 0:112
1961-1970 0:112 0:204 0:128 0:265
1971-1980 0:071 ¡0:015 0:077 ¡0:019
1981-1990 0:072 0:072 0:080 0:079
1991-2000 0:075 0:154 0:094 0:147
2001-2004 0:055 0:039 0:057 0:013
41Figure 4: Time-Variation in Equity Premium: Model and US Data
This panel plots the conditional expected excess stock market return, its conditional standard deviation
and the conditional Sharpe ratio in the model (left column) and in the data (right column). The model-
simulated data were generated by feeding in observed aggregate consumption growth fztgT=2000
t=1929 and the
observed collateral ratio, measured based on mortgages fMOt
Yt gT=2000
t=1929 into the benchmark model. The top
panel plots the expected excess return on a claim to aggregate consumption. The middle panel plots the
conditional standard deviation of the excess return on a claim to aggregate consumption. The bottom
panel plots the conditional Sharpe ratio, the ratio of the expected excess return over its standard deviation.
In the right column all conditional asset pricing moments are constructed from the data in the following
way. The expected excess return, plotted in the top right panel, is computed by projecting the annual
CRSP value-weighted stock return in excess of the annual return on the Fama 3-month T-bill return on the
mortgage-based housing collateral ratio and the Fama 3-month T-bill return (less in°ation over the previous




k ¡(1+i)1=360)2. We use daily S&P500 data from Global Financial Data before
1960, and daily CRSP data afterwards. The expected standard deviation is computed by projecting this
standard deviation on two lags, the mortgage-based housing collateral ratio and the Fama 3-month T-bill
return (less in°ation over the previous year). The bottom right panel plots the conditional Sharpe ratio, the
ratio of the expected excess return over its standard deviation.
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42Table 4: Predictability of K-Year Excess Returns: Data and Model.
Results of regressing log K-horizon excess returns on the housing collateral ratio. The intercept is b0, the slope coe±cient is b1.
The ¯rst panel reports the results in the data. The t-stats in brackets are computed using the Newey West covariance matrix
with K lags. The returns are cum-dividend returns on the value-weighted CRSP index. The collateral scarcity measure f myt
is based on the market value of outstanding mortgages. The long sample contains annual data from 1930-2003. The post-war
sample is from 1945-2003. The second panel reports the same regressions inside the model. The regressions were obtained by
simulating the model for 10,000 periods under the benchmark parametrization with leverage parameter · = 1 (left columns)
and · = 3 (right columns).
b0 b1 R2 b0 b1 R2
Panel 1: Data
Horizon Entire Sample Post-War Sample
1 0:01 0:15 0:02 0:02 0:15 0:04
[0:24] [1:25] [0:63] [1:73]
2 0:07 0:25 0:03 0:06 0:31 0:07
[0:66] [1:11] [0:83] [1:75]
3 0:16 0:31 0:03 0:12 0:46 0:09
[1:02] [0:97] [1:04] [1:80]
4 0:29 0:32 0:02 0:22 0:56 0:09
[1:50] [0:80] [1:42] [1:82]
5 0:38 0:47 0:03 0:34 0:66 0:08
[1:83] [1:16] [1:67] [1:77]
6 0:41 0:79 0:07 0:43 0:89 0:10
[1:70] [1:73] [1:58] [1:86]
7 0:41 1:20 0:12 0:49 1:26 0:14
[1:32] [2:11] [1:30] [2:02]
8 0:37 1:80 0:18 0:50 1:79 0:19
[0:91] [2:71] [1:01] [2:26]
Panel 2: Model
Horizon Leverage =1 Leverage=3
1 ¡0:00 0:13 0:01 0:03 0:12 0:00
2 ¡0:07 0:32 0:02 0:01 0:29 0:01
3 ¡0:16 0:54 0:03 ¡0:04 0:47 0:01
4 ¡0:29 0:81 0:04 ¡0:12 0:70 0:02
5 ¡0:45 1:11 0:06 ¡0:23 0:96 0:03
6 ¡0:62 1:42 0:07 ¡0:36 1:24 0:04
7 ¡0:81 1:77 0:09 ¡0:50 1:54 0:05
8 ¡1:01 2:12 0:11 ¡0:65 1:86 0:05
43Table 5: Long-Term Sharpe Ratios in Data.
the table reports coe±cient estimates for Re
t+1 = b0 + b1Rt + b2dpt + b3lct + b4 f myt + "t+1 and V olt+1 = a0 + a1dpt + a2lct +
a3 f myt + a4V olt + a5V olt¡1. The variables dp, lc and f my are the dividend yield, the labor income-consumption ratio, and the
housing collateral scarcity measure based on the value of mortgages (see Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) for a detailed
description of the data). In particular f myt = max(myt) ¡ myt=(max(myt) ¡ min(myt)), where max(myt) and min(myt) are
the sample minimum and maximum of the housing collateral ratio my. Re denotes the value weighted market return in excess
of a 1 month T-bill return. V olt is the standard deviation of the 12 monthly returns in year t. R1;R5;R10 denote the 1-year,
5-year and 10-year ahead cumulative excess returns. The estimation is by GMM with the OLS normal conditions as moment
conditions. Standard errors are Newey-West with lag length 3. The estimation period is 1927-1992, the longest common sample.
The predicted Sharpe ratio is formed as the ratio of the predicted mean excess return to the predicted standard deviation. The
last three rows indicate the sample mean of the predicted Sharpe ratio, its sample standard deviation, and the sample correlation
between the Sharpe ratio and the housing collateral scarcity measure f my.
Regressors R1 Vol1 R5 Vol5 R10 Vol10
constant -.24 .09 .71 -.004 .76 .05
(s.e.) (.34) (.05) (0.28) (.04) (.42) (.04)
lag ret .04 .74 .76
(s.e.) (.13) (.13) (.08)
dp 1.07 .33 -1.20 .40 .26 .12
(s.e.) (2.00) (.27) (3.16) (.22) (3.00) (.21)
lc .22 -.07 -.76 .03 -.92 -.03
(s.e.) (.32) (.05) (.33) (.03) (.45) (.04)
f my .02 -.01 .48 -.04 .70 .01
(s.e.) (0.20) (.02) (.20) (.02) (.23) (.02)
lag vol .51 .96 .80
(s.e.) (.20) (.12) (.12)
2 lag vol -.18 -.19 .03
(s.e.) (.17) (.11) (.10)
E[Sharpe] .40 1.02 1.12
¾[Sharpe] .10 .18 .20
½[Sharpe; f my] .26 .32 .50
44Table 6: Unconditional Asset Pricing Moments for Collateral Model.
Averages from a simulation of the model for 5,000 agents and 10,000 periods. In the ¯rst column, Rl;e denotes the excess
return on a levered claim to aggregate consumption growth, with leverage parameter · = 3. Rc;e denotes the excess return
on a non-levered claim to aggregate consumption growth. The third column reports the unconditional mean of the risk-free
rate. Columns four to six report unconditional standard deviations of levered and non-levered consumption claims and risk-free
rate. The last two columns report Sharpe ratios on levered and non-levered consumption claims. Panel 1 reports historical
averages for the annual S&P500 return and for the annual real return on a 3-month Treasury bill for the samples 1927-2004 and
1871-1979 (data from Global Financial data). Panels 2-4 are for the benchmark parametrization. Panel 2 reports the results
for the economy with a 5 percent average collateral ratio. Panel 3 reports results for the representative agent economy. Panel
4 reports the moments for the collateral economy with 10 percent collateral on average. Panels 5-9 report results from various
sensitivity exercises. Panel 5 reports the unconditional asset pricing moments for the model with recursive preferences. Risk
aversion is ° = 8 and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 0.2. Panel 6 reports results for di®erent parameters of
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between non-housing and housing services consumption ". All other parameters are held
constant at their benchmark level and there is 5 % collateral. Panel 7 varies the coe±cient of relative risk aversion °. Panel 8
is the benchmark calibration but with an expenditure share process is an AR(1): logrt = ¹ r + ½r logrt¡1 + ¾rºt, i.e. br = 0.
Panel 9 is the benchmark model with 5% collateral, but without conditional heteroscedasticity in the income share process:
´ = [:6935;:6935;:3065;:3065] instead of [.6578,.7952,.3422,.2048].





Sample Panel 1: Data
1927-2004 0:079 0:010 0:207 0:042 0:384
1871-1979 0:058 0:019 0:200 0:052 0:289
(°;") Baseline Analysis
Panel 2: Benchmark 5 percent Collateral Model
(5;:05) 0:039 0:026 0:077 0:167 0:106 0:070 0:230 0:246
(8;:05) 0:103 0:086 0:026 0:266 0:217 0:156 0:388 0:397
Panel 3: Representative Agent Model
(5;:05) 0:024 0:010 0:129 0:127 0:057 0:031 0:186 0:177
(8;:05) 0:045 0:023 0:158 0:146 0:074 0:055 0:309 0:310
Panel 4: 10 percent Collateral Model
(5;:05) 0:031 0:018 0:111 0:149 0:084 0:047 0:205 0:210
(8;:05) 0:079 0:057 0:084 0:210 0:152 0:114 0:376 0:379
(°;") Sensitivity Analysis
Panel 5: Sensitivity - Recursive Preferences
(8;:05) 0:049 0:033 0:048 0:195 0:144 0:069 0:252 0:229
Panel 6: Sensitivity - Varying Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution
(8;:15) 0:108 0:086 0:026 0:277 0:226 0:157 0:392 0:381
(8;:75) 0:142 0:110 ¡0:018 0:241 0:191 0:157 0:590 0:577
Panel 7: Sensitivity - Varying Coe±cient of Relative Risk Aversion
(2;:05) 0:008 0:003 0:086 0:108 0:041 0:011 0:075 0:070
(10;:05) 0:157 0:133 ¡0:021 0:289 0:243 0:205 0:545 0:547
Panel 8: Sensitivity - AR(1) process for Log Non-Housing Expenditure Ratio r
(8;:05) 0:069 0:051 0:018 0:237 0:192 0:129 0:292 0:264
Panel 9: Sensitivity - No Income Heteroscedasticity
(5;:05) 0:036 0:021 0:088 0:161 0:099 0:061 0:222 0:210
(8;:05) 0:057 0:040 0:078 0:196 0:131 0:102 0:291 0:305
45